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In early January 2016, Saudi Arabia executed 47 people including the Shi’a cleric 
Nimr Al Nimr for his involvement in protests in the Eastern Province of the Kingdom. 
The executions were condoned by the Council of Senior Clerics, whose head, the 
Saudi Mufti ‘Abd Al’Aziz bin Abdallah Aal Al-Sheik, stressed that the sentences were 
in accordance “to the sharia’a, and there is no doubt for these are the punishments 
set out in the Koran and they apply to everyone”.i The executions were framed as 
essential for national security, amidst allegations that Nimr was an Iranian agent. In 
neighbouring Iran, there was widespread condemnation. The Supreme Leader, 
Ayatollah Ali Khameni stressed that the move was “a political error on the part of the 
Saudi regime. God will not relinquish [avenging] the blood of the innocent. The 
blood spilled unjustly will rapidly deliver a blow to the politicians and officials of this 
[Saudi] regime.”ii Khamenei later predicted that Saudi Arabia would experience 
“divine vengeance” as a consequence. Shortly after, the Saudi embassy in Tehran 
was set fire to and the Saudi consulate in Mashhad was looted. As a consequence, 
diplomatic relations between the two states were severed, the latest low point in an 
increasingly fractious relationship.  
 
Historical rivals, the 1979 revolution in Iran added a religious dimension, which 
became vitriolic given the existential importance of Islam to Riyadh and Tehran. As 
such, religion began to feature prominently within the political, security and foreign 
policies of both states. The construction of the regional security environment 
provides opportunities for external involvement in the domestic affairs of regional 
actors and with the increasing tensions between regime and society after the 
uprisings. Within this, political life became increasingly contested, as many struggled 
to meet their basic needs within the context of deteriorating and increasingly 
complex political and security situations. Such conditions provided scope for Riyadh 
and Tehran to increase their standing across the region by providing support for 
groups within contested spaces. To this end, the chapter seeks to understand and 
engage with how the fragmentation of political life – and sovereignty broadly – has 
provided scope for the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran to intensify and with it, 
further escalate tensions across the region. 
 
In recent years, the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has become increasingly 
important in shaping the nature of Middle Eastern politics. Building upon the spread 
of religious and ethnic identities and pre-existing schisms between regime and 
society that deepened with the Arab Uprisings, Riyadh and Tehran capitalised upon a 
fragmenting region in an attempt to shape the Middle East in their image. To 
understand this – and indeed the importance of religion broadly – we must consider 
the importance of religion within the fabric of each state, which goes some way in 
explaining the prominence of religion within foreign policy. 
 
Amidst this competition, the nature of regional security calculations would be 
determined by this rivalry, the consequences of which have spread out into the 
wider Middle East. The severity of the situation was stressed by President Barak 
Obama, who noted that  
 
The competition between the Saudis and the Iranians — which has helped to 
feed proxy wars and chaos in Syria and Iraq and Yemen — requires us to say 
to our friends as well as to the Iranians that they need to find an effective 
way to share the neighborhood and institute some sort of cold peace.iii 
 
The US had long been seen as a guarantor of regional security for Saudi Arabia – 
although the presence of external forces in the Gulf was a source of concern for Iran 
– and as such, Obama’s condemnation was met with a great deal of hostility in 
Riyadh. In response, Turki al Faisal, a Saudi prince publicly stressed that   
 
the Kingdom’s 80 years of constant friendship with America to an Iranian 
leadership that continues to describe America as the biggest enemy, that 
continues to arm, fund and support sectarian militias in the Arab and Muslim 
world, that continues to harbor and host Al-Qaeda leaders, that continues to 
prevent the election of a Lebanese president through Hezbollah, which is 
identified by your government as a terrorist organization, that continues to 
kill the Syrian Arab people in league with Bashar Assad?iv 
 
Of course, the sensitivity of Middle Eastern politics in the midst of the Arab Uprisings 
played a prominent role in such security concerns, with the struggle between the 
two states taking on increasing importance in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings. 
Following the protests, the fragmentation of regime-society relations across a 
number of Middle Eastern states resulted in a wide range of socio-economic and 
political challenges, all impacting upon human security and the ability to meet basic 
needs. In these cases, people turned elsewhere to ensure their survival. Such 
existential issues provided scope for the external penetration of a state, particularly 
with the existence of shared religious or ethnic bonds that create strong ties 
between different actors. The severity of the rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran 
meant that such penetration was seen in zero-sum terms through the prism of 
regional security. 
 
To the layperson, at the heart of this rivalry is a religious dimension that pits the 
most powerful Sunni state against the most powerful Shi’a state to shape the nature 
of regional politics. In spite of the prominence of religion, one must be careful not to 
fall back entirely upon religion as the main driving force of the rivalry; indeed, 
sectarian difference need not necessarily be violent or result in animosity. It can do, 
however, when it becomes increasingly politicised and framed in such a way that the 
other poses an ‘existential threat’ to the survival of the state. We see that Islam 
plays a prominent role within the fabric of both Saudi Arabia and Iran and, as a 
consequence, also within foreign policy, yet in both cases, religion is used 
instrumentally as a means of securing legitimacy for domestic and external 
audiences. By the very nature of the umma – the worldwide community of Muslims 
– states that have a prominent Islamic identity have the capacity to speak to people 
across state borders. Such capacity serves as a means of transcending state borders, 
the dawla, and speaking to people of the same faith or doctrine in different 
communities, which is regularly used instrumentally. Of course, there also exists the 
perception that religion is used as a means of mobilising particular communities, 
which is a prominent feature of regional politics. Perceptions are shaped not only by 
shared religious ties but also by historical experience, which also requires 
consideration. 
Efforts to understand the rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran have produced a body 
of literature that can be separated into three camps. The first suggests that the 
rivalry is best understood through a balance of power in the Gulf.v This position 
suggests that states compete for regional hegemony in a range of different arenas 
and when state sovereignty fragments, the opportunity to increase power emerges. 
The second campvi suggests that religion plays a prominent role in shaping the 
nature of the rivalry and that proxy conflicts have been drawn along sectarian lines. 
It boils the rivalry down to an existential struggle about religious difference, 
neglecting the complexity of identity construction – and change – or the political 
ramifications of identity politics. The third camp suggests that a more nuanced 
approach is needed, drawing upon concerns about regime power and legitimacy – 
externally and internally – with the instrumentalised use of religious difference.vii 
This chapter offers a genealogical approach to understanding the rivalry between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, considering the importance of religion within the context of 
each state’s foreign policy agenda.viii In doing this, the chapter is broken down into 5 
sections: the first, considering the nature of relations between the two prior to the 
revolution; the second looking at the first decade of the Islamic republic; the third, 
considering the scope for rapprochement after Khomeini’s death; the fourth, looking 
at the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq; and the fifth, considering the Middle East 
after the Arab Uprisings. Within each of these sections is a reflection upon the 
nature of the rivalry, along with the exploration of the role of Islam in shaping 
actions. Such a breakdown allows for the identification of different periods within 
the rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran, which allows us to acknowledge the 
importance of a range of different factors in shaping the nature of regional security.  
Domestic Factors 
 
In search of an understanding of the nature of the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran, one must also consider the role of religion within both states. The preamble to 
the Iranian constitution of 1979 notes that  
 
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran advances the cultural, social, 
political, and economic institutions of Iranian society based on Islamic principles and 
norms, which represent an honest aspiration of the Islamic Ummah. This aspiration 
was exemplified by the nature of the great Islamic Revolution of Iran, and by the 
course of the Muslim people's struggle, from its beginning until victory, as reflected 
in the decisive and forceful calls raised by all segments of the populations.  Now, at 
the threshold of this great victory, our nation, with all its beings, seeks its 
fulfillment.ix 
 
Similarly, Article 1 of the Saudi constitution declares that  
 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state with Islam as its 
religion; God's Book and the Sunnah of His Prophet, God's prayers and peace be 
upon him, are its constitution.x 
 
It is hard to ignore the symbolic importance of Islam, reflected in the green on both 
flags, along with the Shahada on the flag of Saudi Arabia, which stresses the oneness 
of God and Mohammad’s role as his messenger. It is clear that Islam is built into the 
fabric of both states and such prominence positions religion as a prominent 
characteristic of regional politics.  
 
If one considers state building processes in Saudi Arabia and Iran, the role of religion 
is paramount. For the Al Saud, the centuries old alliance with the Wahhabist ulemma 
provides an integral source of legitimacy, allowing a fringe tribe to claim rule over 
large swathes of the Arabian Peninsula. It is a state run in accordance with the 
Shari’a, which served as a source of the country’s laws, and although a large number 
of people may not identify as Wahhabi, the importance of clerics should not be 
understated.xi Within Saudi Arabia are the two holiest sites in the Muslim world, the 
Grand Mosque in Mecca and the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina. As a consequence, 
the Al Saud have derived legitimacy from being the custodians of the two holy places 
and in doing so, offering protection to all of those who make hajj.  
 
In Iran, whilst religion played a more private role prior to the revolution, in the 
months after the revolution faith was positioned front and centre within the Islamic 
Republic. Khomeini’s vision of veleyat-e faqih (The Regency of the Jurist) suggested 
that in lieu of the 12th Imam, only jurists of a certain status were qualified to rule. 
This position is a serious diversion from traditional Shi’a thought, which suggests 
that there should be a clear separation between religion and politics and, as a 
consequence, deep divisions emerged between clerics following Khomeini in Iran 
and clerics in Najaf under the tutelage of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. In the Islamic 
Republic, a system of checks and balances was implemented to ensure that politics 
was run in accordance with the Shari’a and that Khomeini’s political vision was 
maintained.  
 
Shi’a history played a prominent role within Iran, particularly their construction of a 
foreign policy agenda. Of particular relevance was the Battle of Karbala, at which 
Hussein – the grandson of the prophet – was killed. Hussein spoke out against the 
impropriety of the caliphate at this time, which had accrued vast wealth and 
behaved in a way that was perceived to be un-Islamic. Hussein’s martyrdom, which 
some suggest was his desired outcome, located ideas of martyrdom, guilt and 
sacrifice within the Shi’a experience and Iranian foreign policy.xii It is with these 
domestic factors in mind that we turn to competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran 
and their respective foreign policies.  
Rivalry Before Revolution 
 
To understand the characteristics of the contemporary rivalry, let us begin our 
exploration with a consideration of the rivalry prior to the revolution. In 1929, the 
Saudi-Iranian Friendship Treaty was signed, following dialogue which included 
Iranian officials visiting Mecca to witness Wahhabi governance first hand. In the 
following decades, both states were predominantly concerned with the 
development with domestic infrastructure projects, paying scant attention to 
broader regional trends. Whilst there was a legacy of suspicion directed at the 
‘other’ across the Gulf, stemming from a long history of Arab-Persian tensions, 
relations were largely positive. The first serious point of tension emerged from 
Iranian recognition of the state of Israel, in doing so, positioning Iran on the opposite 
side of the pan-Arab support for the Palestinian cause.  
 
Despite this point of tension, Richard Nixon, at this point President of the US, 
attempted to resolve security concerns in the Persian Gulf by establishing a 2 pillar 
approach, drawing support from both Saudi Arabia and Iran to maintain stability in 
an increasingly important part of the world.xiii Such security calculations were driven 
by a mutual suspicion – and indeed fear – of the military capabilities and intentions 
of the Ba’ath regime in Iraq. Moreover, both were concerned by the legacy of Pan 
Arab thought, which shaped regional politics during the 1950s and 1960s.  
 
Territorial tensions would be a source of friction, particularly over the offshore 
boundaries in the Gulf. Respective coastlines varied between 95 to 135 miles away 
from one another at the northern part of the Gulf, which required an International 
Court of Justice negotiated accord in 1968.xiv Such concerns were bound up in 
concerns about regional security mechanisms in light of the British withdrawal from 
the Gulf. During this time, Iranian influence across the Middle East had increased as 
a consequence of Tehran’s membership of a number of international institutions, 
along with maintaining a position of influence as an ally of the US.  
 
At this time, Gulf security was shaped by the presence of Western actors, 
particularly the British. With the decision to withdraw ‘East of Suez’, a number of 
questions emerged, particularly with regard to the nature of regional security. The 
smaller Gulf states would also be affected, with many gaining independence at this 
time. In Bahrain, independence would raise questions about identity, amidst long-
standing suggestions that Bahrain was the “14th province of Iran”. A UN organised 
plebiscite across the island returned the motion that Bahrainis wished to be 
independent, yet Iranian claims to Bahrain continued.xv  
 
The Impact of Revolution 
 
Unsurprisingly, revolutionary action in Iran dramatically altered regional security 
calculations across the Persian Gulf and Middle East. The events of 1978 and 1979, 
which forced the Shah to abdicate resulted in the establishment of veleyat-e faqih, 
the Regency of the Jurist under Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. 
Khomeini’s vision was anti-monarchical and anti colonial, immediately pitting Iran 
against a number of states across the region.xvi The revolution brought Islamic 
considerations to the forefront of the rivalry, raising existential questions about 
regime security and influence across both the Middle East and wider umma.  
In the formative stages of the Islamic Republic, the importance of Islam was 
abundantly clear to the new regime Tehran, yet also to Riyadh, where the Al Saud 
was reliant upon its long-standing alliance with Wahhabi clerics to provide 
legitimacy. Given this, a spiral of rhetoric emerged that sought to demonstrate the 
Islamic credentials of each state. Things began positively, with King Khalid welcoming 
the establishment of an Islamic Republic: 
 
It gives me great pleasure that the new republic is based on Islamic principles 
which are a powerful bulwark for Islam and Muslim peoples who aspire to 
prosperity, dignity, and well-being. I pray the Almighty to guide you to the 
forefront of those who strive for the upholding of Islam and Muslims, and I 
wish the Iranian people progress, prosperity, and stability.xvii 
 
In turn, Khomeini also sought to stress cohesion across the Muslim world, 
transcending language and sectarian allegiance: 
  
There is no difference between Muslims who speak different languages, for 
instance the Arabs and the Persians. It is very probable that such problems 
have been created by those who do not wish the Muslim countries to be 
united [. . .] They create the issues of nationalism, of pan-Iranianism, pan-
Turkism, and such isms, which are contrary to Islamic doctrines. Their plan is 
to destroy Islam and Islamic philosophy.xviii  
Of course, when relations soured, this rhetoric became increasingly vitriolic and 
divisive. Khomeini’s vision was explicitly stated: 
We will export our experiences to the whole world and present the outcome 
of our struggles against tyrants to those who are struggling along the path of 
God, without expecting the slightest reward. The result of this exportation 
will certainly result in the blooming of the buds of victory and independence 
and in the implementation of Islamic teachings among the enslaved 
Nations.xix 
Saudi Arabia was not immune to this criticism; after all, Khomeini’s vision was 
explicitly anti-monarchical. Given this, coupled with Saudi Arabia’s position of 
leadership within the Muslim world, it would be hardly surprising to see Khomeini 
attacking the Al Saud. 
If we wanted to prove to the world that the Saudi Government, these vile 
and ungodly Saudis, are like daggers that have always pierced the heart of 
the Moslems from the back, we would not have been able to do it as well as 
has been demonstrated by these inept and spineless leaders of the Saudi 
Government.xx  
King Fahd, having succeeded King Khalid, referred to the new regime in Iran as 
“hypocrites and pretenders who are using Islam to undermine and destabilise other 
countries”.xxi Whilst sovereign borders were transgressed, the argument put forward 
suggested that sovereignty was found in God and, as such, both states were dealing 
with the umma, the global community of Muslims, rather than the Westphalian 
notion of a nation-state. This point of tension would be a prominent feature across 
the international relations of Middle Eastern states, particularly amongst those who 
derived a great deal of legitimacy from Islam.  
 
The revolution brought a religious dimension to the rivalry that had previously been 
shaped by geopolitical considerations about the nature of regional security. Religious 
rituals would also take on a political dimension. The hajj of 1987 would be one such 
site of political contestation, when Shi’a Muslims on hajj clashed with Saudi security 
forces, resulting in the deaths of at least 400 pilgrims, 200 of whom were Iranian. It 
was later argued that Iranian agents were involved in creating discontent with 
political motivations. A year later, Iran boycotted the hajj. 
 
A year later, the onset of the Iran-Iraq war resulted in a large-scale loss of life, which 
also drew in regional and international actors, largely on the side of Iraq, who were 
concerned at the potential for Khomeini’s Islamic vision to spread. While neither side 
was fully prepared for war, it was expected by many in Iran that the Shi’a of Iraq – 
long marginalized by the Ba’ath regimes – would join their sectarian kin from Iran, 
yet this view was misguided and underestimated the importance of Iraqi and Arab 
nationalism.  
 
In 1981, the Gulf Co-Operation Council was established, predominantly in response 
to security concerns emanating from the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war. 
During the war, a number of incidents threatened to escalate tensions between 
Riyadh and Tehran, notably an Iranian attack of a Saudi oil tanker and a Saudi attack 
of an Iranian jet.xxii Although threatening to escalate and draw in other Gulf states, 
the conflict remained between Iran and Iraq, ending in 1988. 
 
One of the main reasons for the onset of conflict was Khomeini’s desire to spread his 
ideological vision across the Middle East, particularly to those with a Shi’a minority 
such as Saudi Arabia, other Gulf states, and Lebanon, and those with a 
disenfranchised Shi’a majority such as Bahrain and Iraq. Of those states, two are of 
paramount importance to our discussion of the immediate aftermath of the 
revolution, as a consequence of direct Iranian involvement in the domestic affairs of 
other states.  
 
In Lebanon, members of the newly formed Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps – the 
elite wing of the Iranian military, answerable only to the Supreme Leader – provided 
logistical and financial support to the Shi’a of Lebanon, working with them towards 
the establishment of Hizballah, the Party of God.xxiii The establishment of Hizballah 
provided Iran with a powerful actor on Mediterranean and sharing a border with 
Israel. The ideology of veleyat-e faqih found traction amongst the downtrodden of 
Lebanon, where Shi’a communities were marginalized politically, economically and 
socially.xxiv In the midst of a 15 year long civil war, Hizballah provided support to the 
marginalized Shi’a communities and, over time, the group’s resistance ideology 
would derive a great deal of popular support. Alongside Hizballah, Iran would 
strengthen relations with neighbouring Syria, which also played a prominent role in 
Lebanon, supporting the Party of God. This alliance, between Iran, Syria and 
Hizballah would become known as the Axis of Resistance,xxv challenging the regional 
order. 
 
In Bahrain, viewed by many to be the epicentre of sectarian conflict as a 
consequence of its location in the Gulf between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the 
Kingdom’s demographic constitution left it rife for unrest. Decades of 
marginalization of Shi’a communities provided fertile ground for unrestxxvi and once 
again, with the support of the IRGC, a Shi’a group – the Islamic Front for the 
Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB) – attempted to overthrow the Al Khalifa regime.xxvii 
Although the coup was thwarted before it could begin, the legacy of Iranian 
involvement in Bahraini politics, created suspicion that Iran was behind any regional 
unrest. Saudi fears were mitigated by the construction of the King Fahd causeway, 
although ostensibly designed to improve economic links between the two Gulf 
kingdoms, the causeway served as a means to provide rapid military assistance to 
the Al Khalifa regime if required.xxviii  
 
These two sets of events meant that whenever there was unrest amongst Shi’a 
groups, the belief that Iran was behind the unrest was paramount. Such claims, 
although understandable, were not always accurate. Indeed, the legacy of the 
revolution can also be felt in a number of different ways, serving to inspire Shi’a 
groups across the region, without necessarily having causal links, as was the case in 
unrest in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. Regardless, the perception that Iran 
was behind unrest only served to fuel tensions between the Sunni Arab states and 
the Islamic Republic of Iran.   
 
A Burgeoning Rapprochement? 
 
At the end of the devastating Iran-Iraq war, a generation of Iranians lost their lives 
and the societal and economic consequences were severe, with both economies hit 
dramatically. Such consequences fed into Iranian strategic calculations at this time. 
Recognising the need to develop more favourable relations with neighbours and the 
international community, and also with a lingering fear at Iraqi aspirations, Iran sided 
with Kuwait and tacitly supported the international community’s efforts to liberate 
Kuwait. The amelioration of relations across the Gulf would be a key part of the 
presidencies of Rafsanjani and Khatami over the coming decade.  
 
In 1990, a large earthquake hit Iran, killing 30,000 people, and in response, Saudi 
Arabia sent aid to help.xxix Diplomatic ties between the two were later restored as a 
consequence of this act. In 1997, then Crown Prince Abdullah attended the 
Organization of Islamic Co-Operation meeting in Tehran, in doing so becoming the 
most senior Saudi official to visit since the revolution. Two years later, President 
Khatami visited Abdullah in Saudi Arabia, in the first visit by an Iranian leader since 
the revolution.  
With Khomeini’s death in 1989, space for rapprochement between the two state 
opened up. The presidency of Hoshemi Rafsanjani was one such opportunity, as the 
transition to Ali Khamenei as Supreme Leader – and Khamenei’s legitimacy deficit 
compared to Khomeini – left space for Rafsanjani to take a greater role in the day-to-
day politics of Iran. Under Rafsanjani, the two were able to restore diplomatic 
relations, thawing a frosty relationship in part, by visits of prominent state officials to 
both countries.xxx  
 
In 1999, President Khatami visited Riyadh, becoming the first Iranian President to do 
so since the revolution. The same year, Abdullah attended a meeting of the 
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation in Tehran, becoming the first high-ranking Saudi 
official to visit Iran since the revolution. A series of bilateral deals between Riyadh 
and Tehran were signed, whilst increasing security co-operation across the Gulf 
aided the amelioration process. This led to a period of rapprochement within Saudi-
Iranian relations, although the two states were still characterised by religious 
difference. One reason for this, aside from the trust that had been built in the 
aftermath of the earthquake, was the continued presence of Iraq as a prominent 
player within regional security calculations, where Tehran and Riyadh shared fear of 
a belligerent Iraqi foreign policy under Saddam Hussein.  
 
Despite this, a key historical dimension of the rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran has 
been over contrasting views of the role of external actors in maintaining regional 
security. Iran saw itself as uniquely qualified to ensure regional security, given its 
demographics and long history. In contrast, Saudi Arabia has been reliant upon the 
United States since the Gulf War. This issue would feature prominently in the years 
to come, particularly with an increased US presence in the Gulf in the next decade.  
 
The ‘War on Terror’  
 
In the early part of the 21st century, relations between Riyadh and Tehran appeared 
cordial. The political rapprochement of the previous decade was suppored by 
security co-operation, which resulted in the establishment of a security pact on 
terrorism and drug trafficking. Yet the 9/11 attacks would dramatically alter the 
construction of regional security across the Middle East. As previously noted, 
regional security in the Gulf had long been shaped by the interaction of three major 
powers: Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Any change to the ability of one state to shape 
regional security would have a serious impact upon the ability of the other two 
states. Thus, in 2003, the toppling of Saddam Hussein would have a serious impact 
upon Gulf security, creating a bi-polar system that would have ramifications across 
the Middle East.  
 
The 2003 war was a prominent part of George W. Bush’s ‘War on Terror’, the 
ideological response to the 9/11 attacks, which saw the invasion of Afghanistan in 
2001 and the toppling of the Ba’athist regime 18 months later. In the early stages of 
the War on Terror there was a largely positive relationship between Washington and 
Tehran, with the latter permitting US planes to use Iranian airspace on missions to 
Afghanistan. The 2002 State of the Union speech would end any burgeoning 
rapprochement, however, as Iran was posited as being a member of an ‘Axis of 
Evil’, xxxi  comprising North Korea and Iraq. From this point, relations between 
Washington and Tehran became increasingly fraught, along with relations between 
Riyadh and Tehran. 
 
The US led invasion of Iraq under the banner of Operation Iraqi Freedom was hugely 
unpopular within the international community but within the Muslim world in 
particular. Despite this, few were sad to see Saddam removed from power. This 
action created space within the Persian Gulf regional security complex for Iran and 
Saudi Arabia to compete for influence.  
 
The Iraqi rear guard action was short lived, resulting in the establishment of the 
Coalition Provisional Authority and, ultimately, the transition to Iraq’s first free 
elections. Under the CPA, the decision was taken to eviscerate the Ba’ath party 
infrastructure in an attempt to prevent the party from regaining control of Iraq and 
all party members across the state were fired from jobs in the police, army and 
bureaucratic institutions.xxxii Little did the CPA realise the impact that such a move 
would have, resulting in hundreds of thousands of people being made redundant 
and struggling to provide for their families. Iranian involvement in Iraq’s internal 
politics was multifarious, stemming in part from shared religious ties, a number of 
Iraqi dissidents who had sought safe haven in Iran returning to frontline politics, and 
the presence of a number of powerful militias who received support from Tehran.xxxiii 
 
Rising sectarian violence, in part as a consequence of the presence and competing 
agendas of Al Qaeda members, Shi’a militias and coalition forces, was rife yet the 
regime in Baghdad appeared either unable or unwilling to prevent it. Coupled with 
concerns about ensuring that basic needs were met, these would be key factors in 
explaining why a number of Sunni tribes, particularly from the Anbar province, 
would turn to groups like Da’ish.xxxiv Such conditions, coupled with the presence of 
American forces within the region, in Iraq, Bahrain, and Afghanistan, along with a 
number of other bases, would pose serious issues to a number of actors across the 
region, particularly those of the belief that regional security should be ensured by 
those states within the region. 
 
Although Iranian foreign policy became more progressive under the presidency of 
Mohammad Khatami, particularly as Khatami sought to reach out to global powers, 
this would not last. The election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the bombastic former 
mayor of Tehran, as president of Iran in 2005, however, would be a turning point in 
the construction of regional relations. Ahmadinejad fused a Shi’a outlook with a 
strong sense of Persian nationalism, which became an aggressive part of his foreign 
policy. Despite this bombastic outlook, Ahmadinejad travelled to Saudi Arabia in 
2007, when GCC states were reaching out to Iran, building on increasingly positive 
relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Indeed, Ahmadinejad became both the first 
Iranian president to attend a meeting of the GCC and also to make hajj whilst serving 
as president.  
 
Despite this burgeoning rapprochement, a number of factors would prevent a 
permanent thawing in relations, predominantly coalescing around security, albeit 
defined broadly. Such calculations revolve around national interest and maintaining 
territorial integrity, with a nod towards the Westphalian notion of non-interference 
within the domestic affairs of other states. Yet it also involves an understanding of 
security that sees Islamic legitimacy – and its erosion – as an existential threat to 
regime survival.xxxv  
Saudi efforts to securitize the Iranian threat date back to the revolution in Iran, yet 
the invasion of Iraq in 2003 would cause consternation amongst many in Riyadh. On 
a number of occasions, Saudi officials spoke to their US counterparts, documenting 
the threat posed by Iran. In 2006, Prince Nayif bin Abdul Aziz called for the US not to 
“leave Iraq until its sovereignty has been resorted, otherwise it will be vulnerable to 
the Iranians’”.xxxvi Two years later, in conversation between the Charge and Adel Al 
Jubeir, the Saudi Ambassador to the US, Al Jubeir vocalized the severity with which 
key Saudi officials were viewing the Iranian threat. Al Jubeir recalled  
the King's frequent exhortations to the US to attack Iran and so put an end to 
its nuclear weapons program.  "He told you to cut off the head of the snake," 
he recalled to the Charge', adding that working with the US to roll back 
Iranian influence in Iraq is a strategic priority for the King and his 
government.xxxvii 
 
In 2009, John Brennan, the White House Counter Terrorism advisor met King 
Abdullah, who expressed his concerns about the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri al 
Maliki.  
 
The King said he had “no confidence whatsoever in (Iraqi PM) Maliki, and the 
Ambassador (Fraker) is well aware of my views”. […] For this reason, the King 
said, Maliki had no credibility. “I don’t trust this man,” the King stated, He’s 
an Iranian agent.” […] Maliki has “opened the door for Iranian influence in 
Iraq” since taking power, the King said.xxxviii 
 
Perception at Iranian involvement in the manipulation of domestic affairs can be 
seen across the region, which facilitated this securitization process. In Lebanon, with 
the establishment of Hizballah, in Gaza through its support for Hamas, in Iraq with 
support for Supreme Council of the Islamic Republic in Iraq, in Bahrain with support 
for the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, in Syria with support for Assad, in 
Yemen with support for the Houthis, and in other states with Shi’a unrest. After the 
revolution in Iran, rhetoric from Khomeini, coupled with article 3.16 of the Iranian 
constitution, set out an explicitly proselytizing agenda, grounded in Shi’a thought. In 
the following years, the fragmentation of regime-society relations across the Middle 
East and marginalization of Shi’a communities across the region would provide 
fertile ground for Iran to exploit, and also for perceptions of Iranian involvement to 
develop. 
 
In the years following the invasion of Iraq, the Axis of Resistancexxxix would gain 
power and influence across the Middle East, stemming, in part, from the rising 
popularity of a number of key players, namely Ahmadinejad and Hassan Nasrallah 
(the leader of Hizballah, the Lebanese Party of God). The rising influence of Hizballah 
in particular would pose a serious problem for Saudi Arabia in light of the 2006 war 
between the Israeli Defence Force and the Party of God.xl Despite being an explicitly 
Shi’a actor in its raison d’etre, the Al Saud provided financial support for the 
rebuilding of Dahiya, the southern part of Beirut destroyed by the IDF. Iran provided 
financial assistance in the region of $120 million whilst Saudi Arabia provided $1.2 
billion for the rebuilding efforts.xli  
 
At this point, it becomes apparent that despite religious difference, the quest for 
legitimacy and desire to be seen to do the right thing meant that Riyadh had to 
circumvent the concerns of Wahhabi clerics in Saudi Arabia to ensure that an 
external position of power and influence was maintained, much to the chagrin of the 
Wahhabi clerics.  
 
The Arab Uprisings and the Fragmentation of Regional Order 
 
In late 2010, protests spread across the Middle East emanating from serious schisms 
between regimes and societies. These tensions resulted in the fragmentation of 
state sovereignty in a number of states, which provided new arenas for proxy 
competition between Riyadh and Tehran. Stemming from increased concerns about 
the nature of political organisation and stagnating economies that prevented people 
from achieving their goals, a growing dissatisfaction resulted in people taking to the 
streets to demonstrate their frustration. The self-immolation of Mohammad 
Bouazzizi would be the catalyst for demonstrations across the region, leading to the 
toppling of political elites in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen, whilst regimes in 
Bahrain and Syria were challenged, to varying degrees.xlii The failure of political 
structures, both formal and informal, left people increasingly marginalized, which 
required people to turn elsewhere to meet their basic needs. 
 
Within this context, both Riyadh and Tehran sought to exploit opportunity structures 
to strengthen the self and weaken the other, amidst a zero-sum game for the heart 
of the Middle East.  Ultimately, the fracturing of political organisation and the nature 
of state-society relations after the uprisings provided scope for the two to become 
involved in a number of proxy conflicts, increasingly along sectarian lines. In Syria, 
Bahrain, Iraq and Yemen, the two supported opposing sides in conflicts, adding to a 
long-standing competition in Lebanon. This behaviour – and the rivalry broadly – 
should not be viewed purely as a sectarian conflict; rather, as we have seen, 
sectarian dynamics have been used as a fig leaf for national interest. 
As previously noted, Article 3.16 of the Iranian Constitution articulates that “the 
organization of the nation’s foreign policy based on Islamic criteria, fraternal 
commitment to all Muslims, and unrestrained support for the impoverished people 
of the world.” Within the context of the fragmentation of states and the failure of 
political elites to ensure the protection of people across the Middle East, the Iranian 
constitution explicitly called upon the state to protect those marginalized. Of course, 
Iranian foreign policy in the years following the revolution created the perception 
that Tehran was behind unrest across the region, particularly amongst those states 
with Shi’a minorities. The narrative that Iran was behind unrest in Bahrain and 
Yemen was compelling to many and, with the religious construction of the Middle 
East, the spread of Shi’a groups would leave a number of states open to (the 
perception of) external penetration. 
For Ayatollah Khamenei, the uprisings were framed as an extension of the Islamic 
revolution of 1979,xliii where once again, Iran attempted to position itself at the 
vanguard of regional change.  Whilst regimes sought to ensure their survival by 
stressing that the events were a consequence of sectarian schisms that were 
manipulated by external powers, this denies the agency of protest groups, along 
with rejecting the socio-economic grievances that led into people taking to the 
streets.  
The protests resulted in regimes referring to a range of strategies to ensure their 
survival, including the creation of sectarian master narratives as a mechanism of 
control. Such efforts largely distorted legitimate grievances and divided protest 
groups along sectarian grounds and with it, creating a climate of fear and suspicion 
which often turned to violence. Of course, sectarian difference need not necessarily 
be violent, but the existence of sectarian networks, albeit with different types of 
links between actors in the network, provides an easy opportunity through which 
one can spread messages and mobilise.  The fear of the mobilisation of a Shi’a 
network led to King Abdullah of Jordan referring to a ‘Shi’a Crescent’, mapping an arc 
of areas with Shi’a Muslims from Iran through the Middle East to Lebanon. Despite 
failing to engage with differences within Shi’a thought, particularly over the role of 
clerics within politics, such concerns have shaped the perceptions of many Sunni 
states, particularly Saudi Arabia. 
With the onset of the Arab Uprisings, many regimes sought to frame the protest 
movements as a consequence of Iranian manipulation and interference, drawing 
upon the Islamic Republic’s history and foreign policy behaviour. This strategy 
involved framing unrest amongst Shi’a populations as a consequence of Tehran’s 
“propensity for mischief”,xliv creating divisions within domestic populations, whilst 
also securing regional support from powerful Sunni statesIn the climate of 
uncertainty and instability, the securitization of protest movements would solidify a 
Saudi-led conservative bloc, who were vehemently anti-Iranian and, as time went 
on, anti Islamist.  
 
The competition would spill into a range of institutional arenas, including the OIC, 
which became the site for posturing – and contesting – legitimacy. The OIC would 
take on an increasingly political dimension, when in 2016 the organisation 
denounced “Iran’s interference in the internal affairs of the States of the region and 
other Member States (including Bahrain, Yemen and Syria and Somalia) and its 
continued support for terrorism”. xlv The need to maintain leadership over the 
Islamic world would be of paramount importance in times of chaos,  
 
Independent of the uprisings were negotiations designed to end Iran’s nuclear 
programme and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons across the Middle 
East. Much to the chagrin of Israel and Saudi Arabia, the successful agreement 
between P5+1 and Iran would result in the lifting of economic sanctions that had 
decimated the Iranian economy. Around this time, the price of oil dropped from 
$110 to $30 in 2015 stemming, in part, from Riyadh increasing supply to maintain 
the low price. While the Saudi economy was also hit hard, the thinking was that their 
economy could withstand such pressures, whereas the Iranian economy could not. 
Driving this action was the concern that an empowered Iran would increase its 
sponsorship of its violent proxy groups in particular, Hizballah in Lebanon, and the 
various militias in Iraq. Such increased sponsorship would have the capacity to 
empower these groups and to destabilise their local environments. Moreover, as 
regional security was increasingly seen in zero-sum terms, increasingly influential 
Iranian proxies would coincide with the reduction in Saudi influence. 
 
Such sentiment – and indeed manifest suspicion – about Iranian aspirations would 
be reflective of geopolitical shifts across the region. Within the context of what 
appeared to be an existential struggle for the Middle East, lines between a Saudi led 
alliance of Sunni states (and Israel) and what was termed ‘the Resistance Bloc’, 
comprised of Iran, Syria, Hizballah and Hamas were drawn. Across a fragmenting 
region, such support to the ‘marginalized’ would be appealing. 
 
As sectarian networks were mobilised, the importance of religion became 
increasingly apparent and the failure to adhere to one’s responsibilities to the 
Muslim world would be seriously damaging to claims to legitimacy. In 2015, the hajj 
was the site of thousands of deaths when a crane fell on pilgrims. The failure to 
prevent such events from happening was an opportunity to criticise the Al Saud for 
failing in their duty to protect Muslims making hajj, whilst also attempting to erode 
the legitimacy of Saudi Arabia. In a meeting with the families of the victims, 
Ayatollah Khamenei stated how 
 
The incompetence of the Saudis and the insecurity imposed by them against 
the Hajj pilgrims to the House of God indeed demonstrated that this 
government is not qualified to manage the Two Holy Mosques and this reality 
must be spread in the Muslim world and be understood.xlvi 
 
Whilst a number of Iranians died on hajj, the event was used for political – and 
indeed geopolitical – ends, much like in 1987, to once again demonstrate Iran’s 
position at the vanguard of the Islamic world.  
 
Such concerns about hegemony and legitimacy within the Muslim world continue to 
play an important role in defining the nature of Saudi-Iranian relations. In attempting 
to facilitate this, both Saudi Arabia and Iran have provided financial support to clerics 
from across the world, hosting them for training and providing economic assistance 
in support of their vision of Islam.  
 
Of course, efforts to demonstrate vitality and legitimacy are also coupled with 
desires to depict the weaknesses of the religious establishment in the other. Take for 
instance the following remarks from Iranian officials speaking about the spread of 
Wahhabist ideology 
 
Wahhabism is a tool for the enemies, and Muslims should stay away from the 
heretical Wahhabism… The disagreements and conflicts among Muslims have 
today risen to an unprecedented level. In Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, and 
Bahrain… the heretical Wahhabism is the chief cause of conflict. For 
hundreds of years, Shi’ites, Sunnis, Alawites, and Christians lived together in 
Syria, but when they [i.e. Wahhabi elements] entered [the arena] – look at 
the wars and bloodshed that began. Several Arab countries have become 
tools for the U.S. and Israel.xlvii 
 
Additionally, others presented the view that “The greatest danger threatening Islam 
today is the existence of takfiris, since with their fatwas they proclaim Shi'ites to be 
inferior to [even] the Jews and Christians, and strive for Muslim infighting."xlviii 
 
In return, Saudi officials referred to  
 
the statements of the Iranian regime expose its true [character], as expressed 
by [its] support for terror, and continue the policy of undermining the 
security and stability of the region's countries... By defending the actions of 
terrorists and justifying them, the Iranian regime becomes a partner to their 
crimes, and it bears full responsibility for its policy of incitement and 
escalation."xlix 
 
Such comments would also be presented in Western news outlets, as Adel Al Jubeir 
presented Iran as responsible for widespread regional unrest, with Tehran 
attempting to “obscure its dangerous sectarian and expansionist policies, as well as 
its support for terrorism, by leveling unsubstantiated charges against the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia”.l Jubeir also suggested that Iran was “the single-most-belligerent-actor 
in the region, and its actions display both a commitment to regional hegemony and a 
deeply held view that conciliatory gestures signal weakness either on Iran’s part or 
on the part of its adversaries”.li Once again, after the veneer of sectarianism is 
removed, we see how political and security considerations feature prominently 




The role of Islam as a means of deepening divisions between Saudi Arabia and Iran 
has become increasingly apparent in recent years. Prior to the revolution, despite 
religious differences, the two were able to work together on a range of issues 
affecting them. Even after the revolution, it is possible to identify periods of 
rapprochement where relations between the two appear far more favourable than 
at other times. Yet when sectarian differences become utilised for political ends and, 
perhaps more importantly, when this sectarian difference is securitized for 
geopolitical ends, the divisions between the two become entrenched. When such 
positions emerge, it is important to look beyond what appears to be the driving force 
of violent difference, to consider structural factors both internally and externally, 
which provide scope for the possibility of action. 
 
Such action occurs in a range of different guises, ranging from direct military action 
to support for proxy actors, to competition attempting to ensure legitimacy and 
primacy within the Islamic world. It is undeniable that religion has a role to play, but 
structural factors are equally important. The possibility of improving a position 
within the Persian Gulf or wider Middle East, or an opportunity to solidify the 
regime’s domestic position is perhaps a more important factor, seemingly whatever 
the cost. 
 
What remains clear is that to understand the nature of the rivalry – and ultimately 
for there to be de-escalation – we must recognise the complexity of the issues and 
their regional ramifications. By acknowledging the importance of myriad factors, 
local, regional and international, we are better placed to understand how such 
factors interact across policy decisions and religious beliefs. By accepting this 
complexity, and with it the idea that Islam plays a significant yet not sole role in the 
foreign policy of behaviour, we are better placed to understand the rivalry between 







                                                        
i “Unprecedented Tension Between Saudi Arabia, Iran Following Execution Of Shi’ite Cleric 
Nimr Al-Nimr” Memri, January 4, 2016 https://www.memri.org/reports/unprecedented-
tension-between-saudi-arabia-iran-following-execution-shiite-cleric-nimr-al 
ii “Iran Furious Over Saudi Arabia’s Execution Of Shi’ite Sheikh Nimr Al-Nimr” Memri, January 
4, 2016 https://www.memri.org/reports/iran-furious-over-saudi-arabias-execution-shiite-
sheikh-nimr-al-nimr  
iii Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine”, The Atlantic 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/#5     
iv Turki Al-Faisal, “Mr. Obama, we are not ‘free riders’” March 14, 2016 
http://www.arabnews.com/columns/news/894826 accessed 15.03.16 
v Such as: Furtig, Henner, Iran’s Rivalry with Saudi Arabia Between the Gulf Wars (Reading: 
Ithaca Press, 2006); Chubin Shahram, and Charles Tripp, Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and 
Regional Order (London: OUP for IISS, 1996), Keynoush, Banafsheh, Saudi Arabia and Iran: 
Friends or Foes? (London: Palgrave, 2016)  and Mason, Robert, Foreign Policy in Iran and 
Saudi Arabia: Economics and Diplomacy in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014) 
vi Such as Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 2007) 
vii Mabon, Simon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Soft Power Rivalry in the Middle East (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2013) and Rubin, Lawrence, Islam in the Balance: Ideational Threats in Arab Politics 
(Stanford: Stanford Security Studies, 2014), 
                                                                                                                                                              
viii It should be noted that the focus of this piece is on the role of religion in the 
manifestation of foreign policy, not the role of religion within policy-making processes.  
ix Iranian Constitution, Available at: 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iran_1989.pdf?lang=en  
x Saudi Constitution, Available at: 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Saudi_Arabia_2013.pdf?lang=en  
xi See: Commins, David D., The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (London: I.B.Tauris,) and 
Algar, Hamid, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay (Islamic Publications International: New York, 
2002)., Kostiner, Joseph ‘On instruments and their designers: The Ikhwan of Najd and the 
emergence of the Saudi state’, Middle East Studies, 21, no. 3 (1985), pp298–323, 
Joseph Kostiner,  ‘State, Islam and opposition in Saudi Arabia, The post-Desert Storm 
phase’, Middle East Review of International Affairs, 1, no. 2 (1997).  
xii Edith Szanto, “Beyond the Karbala Paradigm: Rethinking Revolution and Redemption in 
Twelver Shi’a Mourning Rituals,” Journal of Shi’a Islamic Studies 6, no.1 (2013)  
xiii Halliday, Fred, Nation and Religion in the Middle East (London: Saqi Books, 2000), p118.   
xiv Richard Young, ‘Equitable Solutions for Offshore Bundaries: The 1968 Saudi-Iran 
Agreement’, The American Journal of International Law 64 no.1 (1970) 
xv Roham Alvandi, ‘Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and the Bahrain Question, 1968-1970’, British 
Journal of Middle East Studies 37 no.2 (2010) 
xvi Khomeini, Ruhollah, Islam and Revolution. Writing and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, 
translated and annotated by Hamid Algar (Berkely: Mizan Press, 1981).  
xvii Rubin, Lawrence Islam in the Balance: Ideational Threats in Arab Politics (Stanford: 
Stanford Security Studies, 2014) 52 
xviii Ibid., 2 
xix Ibid., 7 
xx Ibid., 5 
xxi Goldberg, Jacob ‘The Saudi Arabian Kingdom’, in Rabinovich, Itovar, and Shaked, Haim, 
(eds.). Middle East Contemporary Survey Volume XI: 1987 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987). 
P589 
xxii Chubin, and Charles, Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order  
xxiii See: Norton, Augustus R., Hezbollah (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007),  Samii, 
Abbas William. ‘A stable structure on shifting sands: Assessing the Hizballah-Iran-Syria 
relationship’, Middle East Journal, 62, no. 1 (2008), pp32–53 and Worrall, James, Simon 
Mabon et al, Hezollah: From Islamic Resistance to Government (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 
2016) 
xxiv Norton, Augustus R., Amal and the Shi’a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (Austin TX: 
University of Texas Press, 1987)  
xxv El-Husseini, Rola, “Hezbollah and the Axis of Refusal: Hamas, Iran and Syria,” Third World 
Quarterly 31, no. 5 (2010)  
xxvi Pandya, Sophia, “Women’s Shi’i Ma’atim in Bahrain’ Journal of Middle East Women’s 
Studies, 6:2 (2010) and Nelida Fuccaro, Histories of City and State in the Persian Gulf: 
Manama since 1800. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 
xxvii Alhasan, Hasan ‘The role of Iran in the failed coup of 1981: The IFLB in Bahrain’, Middle 
East Journal, 65, No. 4 (2011), pp603–17.  
xxviii Mabon, Simon ‘The battle for Bahrain’, Middle East Policy, 19, no. 2 (2012), pp84–97.  
xxix See: “Iran Debates Accepting Quake Relief Aid From Enemies” New York Times, June 27, 
1991 http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/27/world/iran-debates-accepting-quake-relief-
from-enemies.html  
xxx Marschall, Christian, Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami (London: 
Routledge, 2003).  
                                                                                                                                                              
xxxi Hinnebusch, Raymond, and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, (eds) The Foreign Policies of Middle 
East States (London: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2002) 285 
xxxii Tripp, Charles, A History of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 
xxxiii Ibid and Dawisha, Adeed, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009) 
xxxiv See: Mabon, Simon, and Stephen Royle, The Origins of ISIS (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017) 
xxxv Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran 
xxxvi 06RIYADH9175_aSAUDI MOI HEAD SAYS IF U.S. LEAVES IRAQ, SAUDI ARABIA WILL STAND 
WITH SUNNIS (26.12.06)  https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06RIYADH9175_a.html  
xxxvii 08RIYADH649_a SAUDI KING ABDULLAH AND SENIOR PRINCES ON SAUDI POLICY 
TOWARDS IRAQ (20.04.08) https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08RIYADH649_a.html 
xxxviii 09RIYADH447_aCOUNTERTERRORISM ADVISER BRENNAN’S MEETING WITH SAUDI KING 
ABDULLAH (22.03.14) Available from: 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RIYADH447_a.html  
xxxix See: Shai, Shaul, The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror  (Piscataway, 
NJ: Transaction Books, 2005)   
xl Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran 
xli Wehrey, Frederick et al. Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam: Rivalry, 
Cooperation, and Implications for U.S. Policy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009). 
pp81-2.   
xlii Lynch, Marc, The New Arab Wars: Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East (New York: 
Public Affairs, 2016).  
xliii “Khamenei hails ‘Islamic’ Uprisings”, Al Jazeera, February 4, 2011 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/02/201124101233510493.html  
xliv Mabon, Battle For Bahrain 
xlv “Final Communiqué of The Extraordinary Meeting of The Council of Foreign Ministers of 
The Organization Of Islamic Cooperation on Aggressions on The Embassy of The Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia in Tehran and Its Consulate General In Mashhad” Ogranisation of Islamic 
Cooperation January 22, 2016 http://www.oic-
oci.org/oicv2/topic/?t_id=10837&t_ref=4262&lan=en accessed 22.01.16 
xlvi “Saudis not competent to run Islam’s holy mosques”, The Office of the Supreme Leader, 
September 7, 2016 http://www.leader.ir/en/content/16203/The-Leader’s-meeting-with-
families-of-Mina-and-Grand-Mosque-tragedies-in-Saudi-Arabia 
xlvii “Iran Calls for Violent Shi’ite Reaction Against Saudi Arabia” MEMRI, February 12, 2014 
https://www.memri.org/reports/iran-calls-violent-shiite-reaction-against-saudi-arabia  
xlviii Ibid.  
xlix Memri, January 4, 2016.    
l Al-Jubeir, Adel Bin Ahmed, “Can Iran Change?” The New York Times, January 19, 2016  
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/19/opinion/saudi-arabia-can-iran-change.html?_r=2 
accessed 20.01.16 
li Ibid.   
